and objective investigation of the circumstances of the case' -that is, to ascertain the truth, the quintessential goal of inquisitorial justice. 9 Today, the constitutions of several 10 and the Codes of Criminal Procedure of nearly all post-Soviet republics 11 prescribe 'adversarial procedure' (sostiazatel'nost') and equality of arms as governing principles, but commentators tend to limit them to the trial stage of procedure. 12 No post-Soviet codes accord the defence broad adversarial rights at the preliminary investigation, and, in particular, do not allow the defence to be present when witnesses are being interviewed or other evidence gathered. 13 Few of the post-Soviet republics 14 have instituted pre-trial procedures to preserve witness testimony which guarantee the right to confrontation required by international conventions to which the post-Soviet republics are parties. (1991) . Soviet theorists felt that the investigator could incorporate the roles of accuser, defender and judge within himself and maintain complete neutrality. Mikhaylovskaia, below n 52, at 9-10. 13 A right to participate is usually granted only with 'permission' of the investigator: see Model Code s 104(1)(3), as well as CCP-AR s 73(1)(3); CCP-KA s 69(2); CCP-KY s 40(1)(11); CCP-UK s 48(4). In RU there is also no express right to counsel during confrontations between witnesses, CCP-RU s 192, or line-ups involving the defendant, CCP-RU s 193.
14 For exceptions, see CCP-LI ss 179, 234; CCP-MO s 109(3). For a discussion on the trend to 'adversarialise' the preliminary hearing see SC Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach (Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2002) 37-38. 15 Art 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) and Art 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) guarantee the right to confront the state's witnesses. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are bound by the ECHR and all the republics are bound by the ICCPR.
'Long Live the Queen!' Confessions as the Queen of Evidence
The coerced confession was traditionally the centerpiece of nearly all Soviet-era prosecutions despite its inherent unreliability. 16 This has changed little in post-Soviet times. 17 The investigator assembles the rest of the dossier -witness statements, expert opinions, reports of investigative acts -to corroborate the 'truth' of the confession.
The move from inquisitorial to adversary procedure should signify a demotion of the search for truth, to the level of other important values protected by modern constitutions such as the right to privacy, the right to human dignity, the right to due process, etc. 18 Many of the post-Soviet republics have paid lip service to these rights by making exclusion of illegally gathered evidence a constitutional command; 19 and by enacting provisions broader than those in most countries, excluding evidence gathered in violation of constitutional 20 as well as mere statutory norms. 21 But although the right to remain silent is guaranteed in nearly all the post-Soviet republics, 22 the right to counsel before being interrogated, 23 the right may be waived and police and investigators routinely use illegal methods to obtain such waivers. This fact led Russia to introduce a strict exclusionary rule which applies to confessions taken in the absence of counsel, if the defendant retracts the confession at trial. 24 Nevertheless, Russian police and investigators have found a way around this protection by using the so-called 'pocket lawyer' (karmanyy advokat), who actively work with the investigator or police in encouraging the suspect to confess and on occasion watch while the suspect is tortured. 25 The File at Trial: Undermining the Presumption of Innocence and the
Right to Confrontation
Today, as in Soviet times, the trial judge is either the sole trier of fact, or clearly calls the shots as part of a collegial mixed court of 'people's assessors' (commonly known as 'nodders'), who are responsible for deciding all questions of fact, law, guilt and sentence. 26 The only exceptions are the tiny amount of jury trials provided for in Russian law. 27 In Soviet theory, adversary procedure could co-exist with an active trial judge who was obligated to ascertain the truth 28 and this position still finds support today. 29 However, the predominant theory now entrenched in 24 CCP-RU s 75(2)(1). Kommentariy (2002), below n 49, at 206. 25 The lawyer will then be a witness for the prosecution that no torture was used. Confessions at any cost: police torture in Russia, above n 17, at 66. Many 'pocket lawyers' actually share their fees with the investigators who invite them to perform such a role. Marogulova, above n 12, at 54. 26 Russia and the majority of the post-Soviet republics is that a tri-partite division of labour between prosecution, defence and court, is the crucial factor in achieving adversariality. 30 This theory, of course, requires a passive judge no longer responsible for the ascertainment of truth in the matter. 31 The turn to adversary procedure, however, has not led to a change in the trial role of the judge sufficient to guarantee the required neutrality in most of the new codes. It is still the trial judge, who in nearly all trials is also the trier of the facts, who is obligated to read the entire dossier of the preliminary investigation and certify that the evidence is sufficient legally and factually for the trial court to potentially return a guilty judgment. 32 This procedure undermines the presumption of innocence by requiring a 'pre-judging' of the merits of the case which should disqualify the judge as a trier of fact at the trial. 33 Today the parties decide which evidence is presented at trial, whereas in Soviet times this role was carried out by the judge, who was in effect an ersatz prosecutor in more than half of all criminal cases because the prosecutor was not obligated to appear. 34 Most codes no longer require the trial judge to ascertain the truth, but rather to 'create the necessary conditions for the fulfillment by the parties of their procedural duties and the realisation of the rights accorded them.' 35 Observers in Russia, however, report that judges still do the lion's share of questioning of defendants and witnesses in patent disregard for the new procedure. 36 The trial still opens in most post-Soviet republics by asking the defendant whether he admits the charges, and wants to testify; usually preceded by an admonition of the right to remain silent. 37 This procedure is problematic in light of the defendant's presumption of innocence 38 and the prosecution's burden to prove guilt. In Soviet times the defendant nearly always testified, either admitting guilt and hoping for lenience in sentencing in the unified guilt and penalty phase proceedings 39 or retracting his pre-trial confession and contesting the charges. 40 Little has changed in this respect. 41 The often coerced pre-trial confession of the defendant is read in court, whether or not the defendant remains silent or contests its validity, 42 because trial courts uniformly refuse to suppress them despite the widelyacknowledged use of torture and other coercion. 43 In Russia, the defence may not even attack the credibility of the prior statement at trial by alleging unlawful methods, for the Supreme Court of Russia (SCRF) has ruled that such allegations are grounds for reversing acquittal judgments. 44 As in Soviet times, the new codes do not treat the reading of the written material in the investigative dossier as a violation of the otherwiseguaranteed principles of an 'oral' and 'immediate' trial. 45 47 This unreformed approach to the use of hearsay and written evidence which has been prepared in inquisitorial secrecy by law enforcement organs appears to violate the rights to equality of arms and confrontation. 48 In 2001 the CCP-RU 2001 took a hopeful step by excluding all prior statements of witnesses or victims if they failed to appear at trial, unless both parties stipulated otherwise, 49 but pressure by the procuracy led to a return to the old Soviet rule. 50 The file thus continues to act 'in the wings of the trial like the prompter at an amateur play.' 51
Returning the Case for Supplementary Investigation to Avoid Acquittals
Under the Soviet-era codes a judge could refuse to acquit when there was clearly insufficient evidence of guilt if he/she was not convinced of the defendant's innocence and felt further investigation was required for an 'all-sided, complete and objective investigation of the circumstances necessary and sufficient to decide the case.' The case would then be returned to the investigator to look for such hypothetical evidence. 52 The issue was phrased as an 'insufficiency of evidence' upon which to acquit a defendant. 53 Acquittals were seen as a blemish on the work of law enforcement organs and required compensation of those acquitted for unlawful pre-trial detention, 54 so cases with insufficient evidence either disappeared upon return to the investigative stage, or ended with guilty judgments for unfounded lesser offences. 55 The Criminal Code of Procedure of Russia of 2001 eliminated the return of the case for supplementary investigation in its traditional form, 56 inspired by an April 1999 decision of the Russian Constitutional Court (CCRF) which declared that, among other principles, it violated the presumption of innocence and the right to adversary procedure. 57 In December 2003, however, the CCRF backed off its earlier ruling and declared the unconstitutionality of the new provision on the grounds that it violates the victim's right to access to justice. 58 Now the victim or prosecutor may seek to remove a case from the trier of fact to 'restore rights of the victim or the accused violated by law enforcement agencies.' 59 This was a clear victory for the prosecutor's office, which has finally succeeded in giving priority to the rights of the victim over those of the defendant. 60 Law enforcement organs can now intentionally violate the the preliminary investigation were unable to do properly do. IB Mikhaylovskaia, 'Sotsial'noe naznachenie ugolovnoy yustitsii i tsel' ugolovnogo protsessa' (2005) 5 Gosudarstvo i pravo, 111, 116. 53 This language is still found in: CCP-BE s 302(5); CCP-GE ss 426(1)(a), 501. For an excellent discussion of the Soviet concept of doubts 'that cannot be eliminated during the pre-trial investigation and trial (neustranimye somneniia)' see Kovalev, above n 17, at 351-53. 54 In the 'system of statistical evaluation of judicial activity' which dominated in the USSR and Russia, an acquittal was seen as a 'defect.' Morshchakova, above n 9, at 178. 55 In more than half of the cases returned for further investigation judges find the defendant guilty on clearly insufficient evidence but sentence them to credit for time served, resulting in their release. See Confessions …, above n 17, at 120-22.
56 CCP-RU s 237 limited such motions to the stage of the preliminary hearing and restricted the substance of such motions to the correction of errors which prevent a valid judgment from being rendered, or to cases where the accusatory pleading was not handed to the accused. The procurator was given five days to cure these defects. 57 See Thaman, above n 14, at 181-83. 58 Now that Russia's reform has been aborted, the procedure, found in Model Code ss 348, 362, continues to exist in CCP-AR ss 297, 311, 363; CCP-BE s 302(5); CCP-GE ss 426(1)(a), 501; CCP-KA ss 303, 323(1); CCP-KY s 244(3); CCP-LA s 462(3) (when prosecutor wants to amend charges during trial to detriment of defendant); CCP-TA ss 233, 260, 310; CCP-UK s 281; CCP-UZ s 419. The European Court of Human Rights condemned Ukraine for violating the ECHR right to a fair trial, in part on a complaint that returning the case for further investigation violated the right to a fair trial. 60 On the long-time quest of a noted professor in the institute of the procuracy to establish the priority of the rights of the victim over those of the defendant and for maintaining the returning of the case for further investigation. See Franz, above n 40, at 141-44. rights of the victim and then rely on the victim to reassert those rights during trial, after it becomes clear that the evidence will be insufficient for a conviction.
The Acquittal-Free Post-Soviet Landscape
A 'no-acquittals' policy still exists in Russia, and effectively converts the trial court into a mere sentencing court which imposes the judgment sanctioned in advance by the prosecutor in the accusatory pleading. 61 This turn away from the spirit of the Concept of Judicial Reform could be a result of the nearly total domination of Russian democracy by the executive branch under President Putin and its 'power ministries' (siloviki) such as the FSB (successor to the KGB), and, for purposes of criminal procedure, the procuracy, and the unwillingness or incapacity of the judiciary to buck this trend.
In the first three years following passage of the CCP-RU in 2001, the overall acquittal rate (including jury trials) rose from 0.3 per cent to 0.9 per cent. 62 Acquittal rates are likely not higher in other post-Soviet republics. 63 Since post-Soviet reform efforts to bolster the independence of the judiciary from executive organs and the procuracy have largely proved unsuccessful, 64 and because the Soviet-era mixed courts with their 'nodding' people's assessors are an ineffective counterweight to politically dependent judges, the classic jury still appears to be the only means to facilitate acquittals in cases which lack sufficient credible evidence of guilt.
III. PLEA BARGAINING: EMPOWERMENT OF THE DEFENCE OR INQUISITORIAL INDUCEMENT TO CONFESS?

Introduction
As Damaška has noted, the inducement of confessions through procedural arrangements in the hierarchical inquisitorial procedures of the European continent, made it unnecessary for those countries to engage in American style bargaining for guilty pleas. 65 The procedurally induced confession was only 'evidence,' from which the court could infer guilt, for a defendant in the civil law realm could not herself usurp the judicial role by stamping herself as guilty with a plea. Yet, now, many of the post-Soviet republics have introduced new consensual procedures designed to waive their new, albeit flawed, adversarial trial procedures. Are they a natural result of the move to adversarial procedure, 66 or a procedural replacement of inquisitorial truth-seeking judge with his confession-inducing procedural arsenal?
Avoiding the Trial through Confession or Stipulation to the Truth of the Charges
On the European continent, the first inroads into the principle of legality, which required the judge to determine the correct legal qualification of the charged criminal acts and the legal appropriateness of the sentence based strictly on the adduced evidence, were allowed only in the adjudication of minor crimes. Several of the post-Soviet republics have followed this trend and permit conditional dismissals (diversion), 67 penal orders, 68 and victimoffender conciliation (which usually applies only in relation to minor crimes subject to private prosecution). 69 But our emphasis will be on the procedures relating to more serious criminal offences. 70 In more serious cases, the first clear turn to consensual procedures in modern Europe, 71 came with the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 with the introduction of the 'application for punishment upon request of the parties', which provided for up to one third discount on punishment if the bargained sentence was no longer than two years deprivation of liberty. The patteggiamento was the model for Russia's new form of guilt-stipulation. 72 There is a tendency, however, to extend the new consensual procedures to more serious criminal offences. The patteggiamento was extended in 2003 to cases punishable by up to five years (after the up to one-third sentence reduction). 73 The Russian provision, applicable to crimes punishable by no more than five years in the CCP-RU of 2001, was extended in 2003 to apply to crimes punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. 74 Guilty plea procedures also apply to all but the most serious crimes in Estonia and Moldova. 75 However, more wide-open, American-style negotiation of charge and sentence between prosecution, defence and victim, without statutory discounts, exists in the new Estonian 'settlement proceedings.' 76 Americaninspired 'co-operation agreements,' which link plea or sentence bargaining to the defendant's aid in the prosecution of others, have found their way into Georgia, Latvia and Moldova. 77 Estonia and Latvia have also adopted a procedure similar to the giudizio abbreviato introduced in Italy in 1988, 78 where the maximum sentence in the event of conviction is reduced by one-third if the defendant agrees to a 'trial' based in the written material in the investigative dossier. This 'trial' is an ironic replica of the classic written inquisitorial trial of the late Middle Ages, mitigated only by the 1) . 78 Thaman, above n 14, at 159-61.
right given to the defendant, subject to rebuttal by prosecutor and judge, to testify or to introduce supplementary evidence. 79 In Belarus, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and in the Turkmenistan-draft, if the defendant admits the charges when questioned by the judge, the court, depending on the seriousness of the charge, may truncate the evidence to a questioning of the defendant and the victim, move directly to closing arguments, or even directly to the imposition of sentence. 80 
Consensual Procedures in Practice
By 2002, 59.8 per cent of all cases in Estonia were handled with the 'simplified proceedings' which were in force from 1996 until 2004. 81 The use of the Russian consensual procedure has also grown exponentially since it was introduced in mid-2002 and has 'taken root'. 82 The same can be said for Moldova, where plea bargaining resolved around 8. Wide-open American-inspired plea bargaining in Georgia, has been, however, an unmitigated disaster. An American advisor who worked on reforming the Georgian law has called it an 'institutionalised form of bribery.' 84 After the 'Rose Revolution' the new government of Mikheil Saakashvili began targeting members of the ancien regime on corruption charges and would routinely dismiss charges under the new law if the accused paid a large amount of money to the government, without even requiring a guilty admission, much less any kind of 'co-operation' which the original law was intended to encourage. 85 A condition of many 'plea agreements' was also the abandonment of allegations of torture or other unlawful coercion during the preliminary investigation. 86 
III. THE JURY AS ACQUITTAL CATALYST
The ice is breaking, ladies and gentlemen of the jury! The ice is breaking. 87 
Juries and Mixed Courts in the Post-Soviet Republics
For the authors of the Concept of Judicial Reform, the logical answer to the subservient Soviet judiciary and the 'nodding' lay assessors, was the classic jury which would relieve the judge of the duty of determining guilt, provide the foundation for adversary procedure, and make acquittals possible. They suggested juries be used in all cases punishable by more than one year deprivation of liberty, 88 and that the 'nodding' mixed courts be abolished.
A number of former Soviet republics eliminated the lay assessors in the years after independence. 89 Constitutional provisions providing for trial by jury were adopted in Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 90 Provisions for jury trial were also contained in a 'concept of judicial reform' in Belarus in 1992 and were included in the 1999 CCP-BE, only to be removed later at the behest of authoritarian President Alekxander Lukashenka. 91 Other than Russia, only Azerbaijan has actually enacted legislation providing for trial by jury, but its implementation continues to be postponed, allegedly on fiscal grounds. 92 There is, however, new interest in jury trial since the 'colour' revolutions in Georgia ('rose'), 93 Ukraine ('orange'), 94 and Kyrgyzstan ('tulip'). 95 Kazakhstan has taken a path of compromise by introducing a 'jury court,' which began functioning in January of 2007 96 and is patterned on the French cour d'assise, consisting in a 'jury' of nine presided over by two professional judges, but in which 'jurors' and judges deliberate together as in a mixed court. 97 Based on the successes and failures of the Russian jury system, which functioned in nine of its regions and territories from 1993 through 2003 and now exists everywhere except in Chechnya, we can attempt to predict the viability of the future post-Soviet jury systems if they do finally become a reality.
Avoidance of the Jury in Russia
In Russia and in the prospective systems in other republics, jury trials are substantively limited to cases of aggravated murder and a smattering of other crimes. 98 In Russia and in all systems, the right to trial by jury belongs to the defendant and may be waived. 99 Despite the virtual impossibility of obtaining an acquittal in the non-jury courts, a majority of eligible Russian defendants have waived jury trial, choosing ineluctable conviction before professional judges. In the years 1994-2001, only 23 per cent of those eligible proceeded to judgment before the jury court. 100 Since the expansion of jury trial to the rest of the republic defence motions to have their cases heard by juries have declined to around 18 per cent in 2003 101 and to even lower percentages in 2004 and 2005. 102 It is clear that investigators, prosecutors and even defence lawyers pressure defendants to waive jury trial. 103 Cases have also been undercharged, so that they will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the jury courts. 104 The raising of the maximum punishability to ten years under the Russian consensual procedures will not affect trials for aggravated murder or other grievous offences, but a large swath of lesser crimes will now be subject to the new consensual procedures, facilitating the avoidance of jury trial. 105 
Judicial Nullification of the Jury's Power to Determine Guilt
The Russian legislator rejected the Anglo-American general verdict of 'guilty' or 'not-guilty,' in favour of a special verdict consisting in a list of questions, which was adopted by most Continental European countries in the 19th century. 106 The CCP-RU requires that three basic questions be asked with respect to each crime charged by the public prosecutor: (i) has it been proved, that the charged offence was committed; (ii) has it been proved, that the offence was committed by the defendant; and (iii) is the defendant guilty of having committed the offence. After the trifurcated guilt question, questions may be asked which modify guilt. 107 Such special verdicts fit well in a Continental European system which requires reasoned judgments, for they compel professional judges, in writing the judgment, to adhere to the logic of the jurors' decision. 108 They also make juries more accountable, especially when rendering a guilty verdict in a serious case. 109 The Russian and Azerbaijani codes and the Georgian and Kyrgyz drafts allow the jury to compel lenience in sentencing by the judge which encourages guilty verdicts instead of jury nullification when jurors fear Draconian judges or sentencing schemes. 110 Unfortunately, the SCRF has undermined the jury's authority to decide guilt by interpreting the law to restrict jurors to answering questions related to the factual aspects of actus reus, and thus arrogating to the professional bench the power to decide mens rea and thereby, the question of criminal guilt. 111 It has also articulated such a confused and contradictory line of cases on which 'factual' questions the jury may answer and which 'legal' questions are for the professional judge, that errors in formulating the question list have been the main reason for reversals of jury judgments, especially of acquittals. 112 The Azerbaijani jury law has abandoned the complicated Russian question list in favour of two simple questions, one of guilt and another as to whether the defendant should receive a lenient sentence; and the parties may request supplemental questions related to lesser-included offences and mitigating circumstances. 113 The most recent draft of the future Georgian CCP goes the furthest, however, in introducing an American style general verdict of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' as to each charge. 114 The Georgian draft also follows American law in making jury acquittals final and not subject to appeal. 115 Post-Soviet juries will never function autonomously, as true juries, unless their (acquittal) verdicts are not subject to arbitrary reversal by the higher courts. Unlike in the US, the procurator and the victim may appeal judgments of acquittal. 116 Since errors need not be raised in the trial court to preserve them for appeal, a number of prosecutors and judges have intentionally committed errors at the pre-trial and trial stage so that, in the event of an acquittal, the errors may be later raised on appeal. 117 Despite the serious nature of the crimes tried in the jury courts, there has been a much higher rate of acquittals (around 15 per cent) in those courts than in the regular courts (less than 1 per cent) . 118 Yet the SCRF has reversed acquittals at an astonishingly high rate in comparison to convictions: from 1997-2001 it reversed approximately 50 per cent of all acquittals and only 16-17 per cent of convictions. 119 The trend continued in 2004 with the SCRF reversing 45.8 per cent of all acquittals which were appealed as opposed to 3.9 per cent of convictions. 120 Russian courts have cleverly turned the new rules of adversarial procedure, introduced to protect defendants from Soviet-era abuses, into vehicles for overturning acquittals and other defence-favourable verdicts. Thus when a defendant successfully suppresses illegally gathered evidence under the new Russian exclusionary rule it is not infrequent that the prosecutor or the victim appeals on grounds that their adversary rights have been violated. 121 Once the victim is granted 'equality of arms' in an adversary trial, 122 the prosecution has a Trojan horse it can send into the arena to undermine the adversarial rights of the defendant. The SCRF has not hesitated to reverse jury acquittals when the aggrieved party has complained of a supposed violation of his or her rights. 123 
CONCLUSION
Our social life is like swampy, shaky ground. No matter how wonderful a building is erected on this ground, it vanishes in an unseen manner into this ground, little by little it is sucked up by this soil.
VD Spasovich 124
Can one change the hierarchic, inquisitorial Soviet system of justice by introducing alien institutions from the co-ordinate common law legal sphere? Is a process of 'Americanisation' going on, especially in light of the many American advisers 125 who have been involved in the reforms in many of the former Soviet republics? Can we talk of transplants or translations of these co-ordinate institutions, 126 or merely of their use as democratic legitimisation for systems reluctant to allow these institutions to be catalysts for real change? Will the face of justice in these countries reveal in the end an adversarial American smile, or the 'two-faced' smirk of the entrenched bureaucrats dressed in their new democratic clothes? 127 The fact that Russia, where all decry the abysmal quality of criminal investigations, 128 can maintain its acquittal-free system despite the introduction of adversary procedure and jury trial leads one to ask whether this 'co-ordinate' edifice is actually only a Potemkin village behind which the coerced confession and the perfunctory benediction of contents of the file and accusatory pleading will continue to shape Russia's criminal justice reality. 129 More frightening is the notion that, with the expansion of guilty pleas, the charade of an oral, immediate trial will also be dispensed with and adjudication will recede behind closed doors as in the times of Stalinist terror. If Russian defendants can be coerced or inveigled into waiving a 15-20 per cent chance of getting an acquittal for the inevitable conviction, there is no reason to believe that their waivers of trial and acceptance of the discounted sentence upon guilty plea will be any more voluntary.
A plea bargaining system can only reach just and verifiable results in the post-Soviet world if it is based on evidence gathered pre-trial that has been subject to adversarial testing, which can really provide a factual basis for guilt. 130 The post-Soviet codes provide the framework for exclusion of illegally seized evidence but have in no way changed the inquisitorial pre-trial pre-packaging of the evidence by the prosecuting organs, despite token and ineffectual grants to the defence of the right to collect evidence by themselves. 131 Although the one-third discount model of consensual procedure is not as inherently coercive as the wide-open American model, 132 defendants will have no 'bargaining chip' until juries become autonomous co-ordinate decision-makers, not just decoration at an intermediate step in the hierarchical juggernaut of conviction.
The pseudo-oral and pseudo-immediate trial based on the dossier and guided by its truth-seeking judicial trier of fact, and its procedural inducements of confessions, which itself has been characterised by some writers as a form of plea or sentence bargaining, 133 at least requires an in-court confession subject to adversarial testing and a written judgment founded in the materials of the investigative dossier. 134 The more perfunctory the guilty plea and the review of its factual basis, the more risk that innocent persons will end up at the other end of the conveyor belt. 135 
